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A Novel Dynamic Decision Model in 2-player Symmetric Repeated Games

         

摘要

Considering the dynamic character of repeated games and Markov process, this paper presented a novel dynamic decision model for symmetric repeated games. In this model, players' actions were mapped to a Markov decision process with payoffs, and the Boltzmann distribution was introduced. Our dynamic model is different from others', we used this dynamic model to study the iterated prisoner's dilemma, and the results show that this decision model can successfully be used in symmetric repeated games and has an ability of adaptive learning.

著录项

  • 来源
    《工程科学(英文版)》 |2008年第1期|43-46|共4页
  • 作者单位

    Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072 , China;

    Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072 , China;

    School of Management, China University Of Geosciences,Wuhan 430074 ,China;

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