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相关者利益“对立”下的企业社会最优绩效实现研究

         

摘要

Although the enterprise’s social responsibility is a hot issue of common concern, its performance in practice can not receive a good result. This paper researches possibility and progress to realize optimal society performance of business by making use of empirical study and game analysis proceeded from enterprise’s social optimal performance. The study shows that there are forward and reverse factors in the factors which affect enterprise’s social optimal performance and the government and operators is the main or even decisive factors. In order to avoid profit of all the stakeholders being eroded, all the stakeholders are willing to coordinate to realize enterprise’s social optimal performance. This increased revenue attracts industrial organization or even all the enterprises to perform social responsibility and make resource allocation and profit distribution to be in situation of pareto optimality. Hence the realization of enterprise’s social optimal performance is the result that the two reverse strength game in cooperation and realize equilibrium. The balance is the result of coordination of stakeholder and a relative steady state. Hence, in order to make enterprises to perform their social responsibilities, it is necessary to increase effective institution supply and to play the government’s management role of alternate kindness with severity management. At the same time, it can realize sustainable development by enforcing operators’ ideas of social responsibility and making them to perform coordinative strategies.%  企业社会责任,虽是理论界一直关注的热点问题,但实践中的企业社会绩效并不尽人意。本文从企业社会最优绩效出发,运用实证研究和博弈分析的方法,探寻在企业各方利益的相互牵制与对抗中,企业社会最优绩效实现的可能性及实现的过程。研究表明在影响企业社会最优绩效的因素中,存在着正向和反向因素,其中政府、经营者是最主要的甚至是起决定性作用的因素。为了企业全部相关者利益不被无谓的“蚕食”,所有利益相关者愿意达成合作,企业社会最优绩效实现。这种“合作剩余”吸引着产业组织乃至整个社会企业社会责任的履行,从而使资源配置、利益分配达到帕累托最优状态。故企业社会最优绩效的实现,就是影响其因素中的两种相反力量合作博弈而达于均势的结果。诚然,“均势”的形成,必须增加有效的制度供给,发挥政府“刚柔相济”的管理作用。同时,强化经营者的责任理念,促使其采取合作的策略,以实现农业、社会经济可持续发展。

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