厂商之间的价格歧视竞争和消费者议价能力对创新激励会产生较大影响.消费者对商品的偏好存在差异,讨价还价能力也大有不同.建立模型研究市场上讨价还价消费者的存在对于寡头厂商投资激励和定价行为的影响,以及寡头厂商在歧视性定价和统一定价体制下的投资选择问题.在考虑了消费者讨价还价能力的歧视性定价均衡中,厂商对价格接受者索取高价,而对讨价还价者索取低价.如果禁止价格歧视,相比歧视性定价,接受价格的消费者支付相同的价格,讨价还价消费者支付更高的价格,降低了消费者剩余.价格歧视减弱了厂商之间的投资竞争,导致厂商减少投资,而禁止歧视性定价,增强了厂商的投资激励,同时增加了厂商的利润和社会总福利.公共政策的制定不仅要考虑到效率,还要充分考虑不同群体的收入分配.%The price discrimination competition among firms,and the bargaining ability of consumers have great impact on innovation incentives of firms. Consumers' preferences for goods are heterogeneous,and bargaining abilies are different. Through a theoretical model,this paper studies how the existence of bargaining consumers in the market affects investment incentives and pricing behavior of duopoly firms. The paper studies duopoly firms' investment choice under discriminatory pricing and uniform pricing. At consumers' bargaining pricing equilibrium,firms offer lower prices to bargaining consumers and higher prices to price-take consum-ers. If discriminatory pricing are prohibited,compared with the discriminatory pricing,price-taken consum- ers pay the same prices,but bargaining consumers pay higher prices,and the total surplus of consumers de-clines. Price discrimination reduces the investment competition between firms,and the firms make less invest-ment. Prohibiting discriminatory pricing enhances the firms'investment incentives,and increase both the prof-its of firms and total social welfare. Public policy maker should not only focus on efficiency,but also consider the income distribution of different parties.
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