首页> 中文期刊> 《审计与经济研究》 >广告宣传、信息不对称与债务融资成本

广告宣传、信息不对称与债务融资成本

         

摘要

Based on the limited attention theory, this paper surveys the relation between advertising, information asymmetry and cost of debt. The result shows that advertising can attract investors’ attention, thus lowering the financing cost of debt through mitigating the problem of information asymmetry. This result indicates that advertising can mitigate the ignorance para-dox, thus decreasing the financing cost of debt. Moreover, for non-stated owned firms and those with poor performance, the advertising can lower the financing cost of debt to a larger extent. Finally, advertising effect may be stronger for firms located in regions with better legal system or social credibility.%基于有限注意理论的视角,研究了广告宣传对信息不对称和债务融资成本的影响。结果表明,广告宣传能够增加投资者对公司的关注,从而通过降低信息不对称降低债务融资成本,这意味着广告宣传能够降低理性忽视问题,从而为公司融资提供便利。此外,对于非国有企业以及绩效较差的企业而言,广告宣传降低债务融资成本的程度更大;最后,地区法律环境越好或者受信任水平越高,广告宣传对于债务融资成本的降低作用更强。

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