It is generally accepted that if headquarters is uncertain about intrinsicc capability (high or low) to control production cost of its workplaces under asymmetric information, then managers in the location with high capability to control cost have the chance and intention to disguise real ability of workplaces.As the manager has to confront a more severe standard cost program in the next period once capability revealed.The ratchet effect arises when the manager supplies low effort and high cost to avoid more demanding schedules of cost control in the future.A workplace rotation can restraint such ratchet effect, but at the same time, it sacrifices experience curve effects.In this paper, two-period game model is introduced, under which the optimal payoff scheme is designed and condition of rotation to motivate manager effectively explored.%不对称信息下,公司总部不确定组织内各工作地的内在产品成本是高(低效率)还是低(高效率),高效率工作地管理者有机会和动机掩饰其内在能力,因为一旦能力变得已知,生产单元可能面临更加严苛的下期标准成本方案.为避免总部提高成本控制绩效要求,生产通过付出低努力和实现高成本来应对,棘轮效应出现.实施工作地轮换,抑制棘轮效应的同时,损害经验曲线效应.本研究通过构建两期博弈模型,设计最优支付方案,提出有效的工作地轮换条件.
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