Based on the analysis of engineering project tendering practice in the railway sector in China over the past 10 years,mainly discussed multiple and repetitive game behaviors between the owner and contractor dur-ing railway construction project contracting. By building the evolutionary game model of the relationship be-tween the owner and contractor in railway engineering projects under bounded rationality,the paper analyzed the evolution process and the evolutionary equilibrium strategies of both sides of the game to explore the condi-tion of cooperative behavior between the owner and the contractor,in order to explain the formation and evolu-tion of the bidding mode,competitive negotiation and protocol mode. The results show that the cooperation be-haviors between the owner and contractor are path dependent. The cooperation probability between them is positively related to initial cost input and cooperative income factor of the two parties,and is negatively related to the external incentive factor. Optimal allocation ratio of cooperation benefits and costs results in greatest co-operation probability between the two parties. The rational default cost and strong control may help to reduce opportunistic behaviors.%在对近10年中国铁路工程项目招投标情况初步分析的基础上,重点探讨铁路工程项目承发包过程中业主与承包商之间多重、反复的博弈行为.构建有限理性下铁路工程项目业主和承包商关系的演化博弈模型,分析博弈双方行为的演化路径和稳定均衡策略,探究业主和承包商合作行为的产生条件,以解释招投标方式、竞争性谈判和协议模式的形成、演进规律.结果表明:业主与承包商之间的合作行为具有路径依赖性,二者之间合作的概率与二者的初始成本投入和合作收益因子正相关,与外部激励因子即一方违约时对其所处罚金负相关;存在最优的合作收益与成本分配比例使得二者合作概率最大;同时合理的违约成本与强有力的管控有利于减少机会主义行为的产生.
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