Pay-based Screening Mechanism: Personnel Selection in the View of Economics Theory

著录项

• 来源
  《东华大学学报：英文版》 |2003年第4期|91-97|共7页
• 作者

  刘帮成; 唐宁玉;

  展开▼
• 作者单位

  Aetna School of Management;

  Shanghai Jiaotong University;

  Shanghai 200030;

  Aetna School of Management;

  Shanghai Jiaotong University;

  Shanghai 200030ased on economic theories;

  the paper studies the personnel selection at the asymmetric job market using signaling and screening model. The authors hold the opinion that an organization can screen the candidates' signaling based on the self-selection principle by providing an appropriate compensation choice. A pay-based screening mechanism is proposed to help the organization drive away the nonqualified applicants and retain the excellent applicants.;

  展开▼
• 原文格式 PDF
• 正文语种 chi
• 中图分类 人事管理;
• 关键词

  经济学理论; 职员挑选; 人才市场; 候选人; 补偿机会; 优秀申请者; 人力资源管理; 个人能力;

  机译：信令;信令失真;基于付费的筛选机制;自选;