针对导游服务外包过程中，因不对称信息而引发的导游服务商败德行为问题，以旅行社和导游服务商之间的委托代理关系，设计了旅行社参与下的导游服务外包激励机制，并通过信息对称和信息不对称下的模型分析，探讨了影响导游服务外包激励契约参数、旅行社和导游服务商的最优努力水平相关因素。研究结果表明：不对称信息下，导游服务商和旅行社的努力水平不仅受自身因素如服务能力等的制约，还受对方因素以及旅游服务市场不确定性的影响；高服务能力且有意愿承担风险与责任的导游服务商获得的业绩分成越高。%In view of the problem of tour-guide service providers' moral hazard caused by asymmetric information in the tour-guide service outsourcing, designs the incentive mechanism for tour-guide service outsourcing based on the contract-issuing party participation and the principle-agent relationship between travel agency and tour-guide service provider. By analyzing the models of asymmetric information and information symmetry, discusses the incentive contract parameters of tour-guide service outsourcing and the optimal effort level relative factors of tour-guide service provider and travel agency. The results show that under asymmetric information, the effort level of tour-guide service provider and travel agency not only are affected by their own factors such as service capacity constraints but also are affected by other side factors and the uncertainty of tourism market. The tour-guide service provider with high service ability and willingness to undertake risks and responsibilities will get more earnings.
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