Both duration and quality are important objects in the project-based supply chain because they can influence project fulfillment. Constructing schedule needs to take the project quality control into consideration.Reasonable scheduling can ensure the timely completion of a project, guarantee necessary project quality, and follow the project value-adding procedure to improve quality.Traditional project-based organizations tend to consider project value-adding activities from the single perspective of either duration or quality. This approach can result in grossly inefficiency procurement of project value-adding objects. The paper firstly takes the cost substitutability of duration and quality objects into consideration from the project value-adding perspective, and uses different project control objects as incentives. Finally, it analyzes the influence of coordination equilibrium between duration and quality on project value-added objects.Based on the assumption of equal cooperation in project-based organizations, this paper investigates the incentive of all project controlling goals between project management enterprise and contractors. With project value appreciation maximized, the relationship between the project object and effort cost is taken into consideration and project-based supply chain cross-organizational incentive model of cooperative duration-quality object is established. The research result shows that project-based supply chain cross-organizational cooperation works in practice as follows;(1) Either the duration-quality coordinative objective incentive or single objective incentive can promote the project value level, increasing the net benefit of project management enterprise and contractor;(2) Whether the linear relationship between duration and quality object exists or not, executing the duration-quality coordinative objective incentive obtains higher project value-adding level than single ones, and so does the net benefit for project management enterprise and contractor;(3 ) Under the duration-quality coordinative equilibrium, project management enterprise and contractor possessing the best effort level and incentive intensity on different control objects can maximize project's values;(4) In contrast to duration-quality coordinative equilibrium objective incentive, single objective incentive method improves the project value at the price of another controlled object incentive loss. In particular, increasing one objective incentive intensity will absolutely decrease the other; and(5) Essentially the contractor undertakes more risks than project management enterprise. Thus, the contractor is more willing to choose duration-quality coordinative equilibrium incentive in order to obtain a lager profit and improve the two control objects.Therefore, whether the linear relationship between duration and quality exists or not, the project management enterprise resorting to adjust project object objective incentive intensity and implementing duration-quality coordinatire incentive strategy could not only achieve project value-adding maximization, but also realize net earnings, and Pareto improvement between project management enterprise and contractor. These benefits can make the contractor reasonably allocate the effort level and resources between the duration and quality objective, and realize duration-quality coordinative equilibrium.This paper enriches and improves the theory and system of supply chain incentives, contributes to project cooperative environment, and provides reliable theoretical guidance and decision support for objective incentives in project management to add vahie to projects.%在假定项目型组织之间平等合作的基础上,从项目价值增值最大化角度,考虑工期-质量目标努力成本关系,构建并剖析工期-质量协调均衡的项目导向型供应链跨组织激励模型,并对模型进行数据模拟和算例分析.结果表明,不论工期-质量目标间努力成本是否存在线性关系,以调整不同控制目标的激励强度为协调手段,实施工期-质量协调激励策略不仅可实现项目导向型供应链项目价值增值的最大化,而且可实现合作双方净收益的帕累托改善,进而使得承包商在工期-质量目标上合理分配资源和努力水平,实现项目工期-质量目标间的协调均衡.
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