Information asymmetry is an inherent issue in most R&D outsourcing projects. R&D outsourcers hold confidential market information, whereas suppliers hold technical information. In this paper, we proposed a game model to investigate the arrangement of different profit sharing mechanisms to motivate outsourcers and suppliers to reveal confidential information to each other. The purpose of this model is to solve the inherent issues of concealing confidential information by both parties and potential problems caused by the prevalent practice.First, the traditional profit sharing arrangement, such as a fixed profit sharing arrangement, a proportional profit sharing arrangement, or a mixed profit sharing arrangement, cannot prevent double-sided adverse selection problems and moral hazards from happening to R&D outsourcing projects.This paper proposes a new mixed profit sharing model combining proportional sharing, fixed payment, allocation proportion and quantity of fixed payment. The new profit-sharing arrangement can avoid double-sided adverse selection and moral hazard problems in R&D outsourcing projects and motivate both R&D outsourcers and suppliers to reveal confidential information. In addition, the new model can help adjust both sides' profits by delivering fixed payments and changing the allocation proportion of R&D suppliers. With the profits fairly adjusted, both sides would be motivated to share confidential information with each other.R&D suppliers of high technology can take a fixed payment and raise the allocation proportion, whereas R&D suppliers of low technology can reduce the allocation proportion. This arrangement enables R&D suppliers to have reserved profits. As such, suppliers are discouraged from taking outsourcers' profits. Both sides would thusly be more willing to cooperate with each other in R&D outsourcing projects.%研究了如何利用利益分配方式作为激励机制,促使研发外包合作双方如实告知其私人信息并付出应有努力或投入足够研发资源.证明了现有的固定支付、产出分享和混合支付等三种传统利润分配方式下,研发外包合作双方均存在告知虚假私人信息并降低努力程度的道德风险.在此基础上设计出一种产出分享加固定转移支付的新混合分配方式,并给出了双方的分配比例和转移支付量,最后证明了该分配方式可以规避研发外包中的双边道德风险,激励合作双方如实告知其私人信息并付出应有努力程度.
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