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不同关系港口间的博弈

         

摘要

为研究港口间存在的领导-追随、竞争-竞争、合作-合作和合作-竞争等多种关系对港口吞吐量和收益的影响,构建博弈模型分析比较不同关系下的港口的吞吐量和收益.研究结果表明:(1)对于处于领导地位的港口而言,在领导-追随关系下的收益和吞吐量大于在竞争-竞争关系下的吞吐量和收益;对处于追随地位的港口而言,情况恰好相反.(2)在主从关系中,虽然处于领导地位的港口有较大的先发优势,但港口双方也有合作的积极性.由于背叛行为可能会出现,政府应该加强对港口的监管.%In order to study the effects of relationships between ports, such as leader-follower, competition-competition, cooperation-cooperation and cooperation-competition, on port throughput and revenue, a game model is constructed to analyze throughput and revenue for ports with different relationships.The results show: (1) For the ports as leaders, the throughput and revenue in the leader-follower relationship are higher than those in the competition-competition relationship;for the ports as followers, the situation is the opposite.(2) For the two ports in the leader-follower relationship, although the port as a leader enjoys substantial first-mover advantages, the two ports have the enthusiasm of cooperation.Due to the probability of betrayal behaviors existing, the government should strengthen port supervision.

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