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中央银行独立性理论综述

         

摘要

The idea of central bank independence is nearly as long as the history of the central bank itself, but it was not a systematic theory until the appearance of “dynamic inconsistency” and “political business cycle”. Till the mid and late 1990s, central bank independence has made encouraging achievements from both normative and empirical aspects, but there are still many scholars who have been criticizing and challenging the central bank independence theory. In response to this challenge, Keefer&Stasavage, Egg-ertsson & Le Borgne, etc. have been developing the central bank independence theory. After the 2008 financial crisis, a new con-clusion was made on the central bank’ s independence.%中央银行独立性的思想几乎和中央银行的历史一样漫长,但是真正把中央银行独立性提高到理论规范的基础是“动态不一致”理论和“政治经济周期”理论。到20世纪90年代中后期,中央银行独立性从规范和实证两方面都取得了令人鼓舞的成果,但仍然有许多学者对之提出了批评,对中央银行的独立性理论提出了挑战。为应对这一挑战, Keefer &Stasavage , Eggertsson&Le Borgne等对中央银行的独立性理论进行了发展和完善。2008年金融危机后,中央银行的独立性再次有了新的结论。

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