STABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN LEADERSHIP MODEL

Jin ZHANG; Shouyang WANG; Lei ZU

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STABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN LEADERSHIP MODEL

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International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) are a form of cooperation ratified by countries which can improve the management of shared environmental resources. The authors analyze the stability of International Environmental Agreements in leadership model. In 2006, Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis found that a stable coalition consists of either 2, 3, or 4 members if the number of countries is greater than 4. Their model is reconsidered. It is shown that the size of stable IEAs decreases from 3 to 2 when the total number of countries involved increases. However, a situation that can guarantee 4 to be the size of stable IEAs could not be found.

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来源
《系统科学与复杂性：英文版》 |2008年第2期|184-190|共7页
作者
Jin ZHANG; Shouyang WANG; Lei ZU;
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作者单位

Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7, Canada;

School of Management, Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China;

School of Management, Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China;

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原文格式 PDF
正文语种 chi
中图分类计算技术、计算机技术;
关键词
Coalition; International Environmental Agreements; leadership model; sequential game; stable size;

机译：联盟;国际环境协定;领导模式;顺序游戏;尺寸稳定;

STABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN LEADERSHIP MODEL

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