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公平关切下基于政府补贴的港口供应链协调机制研究

         

摘要

In this paper, against the background of inter-modal transportation, we established the three-echelon port supply chain model composing of the port, maritime shipper and land shipper, among whom there existed the Stackelberg game. Through analyzing the influence of the effort level of the three on their unit container profit, we found the unfairness between the participants, that is, by the same effort level, the increased return rate of the maritime shipper and the land shipper was less than that of the port; next, we analyzed the respective optimal unit container profit for each of the three when the land shipper was concerned with the fairness with the maritime shipper as the point of reference and when the maritime shipper was concerned with the fairness with the port as the point of reference;and at the end, we established the government subsidization based interest coordination mechanism of the supply chain.%研究港口供应链参与者之间的关系不仅需要考虑利益问题,还需考虑公平问题。在多式联运的大背景下,建立了由港口、航运承运人和陆运承运人组成的三级港口供应链模型,三者之间存在Stackelberg博弈。通过分析三者各自的努力程度对于三者单位集装箱利润的影响,发现参与者之间存在不公平现象,即航运承运人和陆运承运人付出一定的努力,其利润的增加比例小于港口利润的增加比例;接着,分析了陆运承运人存在以航运承运人为参考点的公平关切以及航运承运人存在以港口为参考点的公平关切时,三者各自的单位集装箱利润最优值;最后,建立了基于政府补贴的协调机制,弥补了不公平,协调了供应链。

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