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媒体监督、异常审计费用与企业盈余管理

         

摘要

From the perspective of auditing,this paper investigates how the negative media coverage affects the company's earnings management behaviors,and further analyzes the impacting mechanism and the implementation path.The study with data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003-2014 proves that the more negative media coverage,the stronger motivation of earnings management for the managers and the more intending of choosing the real earnings management when they are accused of financial fraud by the media,which verifies the market pressure hypothesis.Further analysis shows that negative media coverage achieves some supervisory functions through external auditing.The more negative media coverage is,the higher the abnormal audit fees and the stronger inhibitory effect of the auditing on earnings management.In addition,it is also found that the authority of the media and the professionalism of the media coverage enhance the inhibitory effect of the auditing on earnings management.This paper shows that negative media coverage has a role in corporate governance by the way of auditing,and the governance effect relies on the authority and the professionalism of the media coverage.%本文从审计视角,探讨媒体负面报道对企业盈余管理行为的影响,并进一步分析了影响机理与实现路径.利用2003-2014年中国A股主板上市公司的数据研究发现,媒体负面报道越多,管理者盈余管理的动机越强,并且在公司面临媒体财务舞弊指控时会更多的选择隐蔽性较强的真实盈余管理行为,验证了市场压力假设.进一步分析表明,媒体负面报道通过外部审计实现部分监督功能.媒体负面报道越多,异常审计费用越高,审计对盈余管理的抑制作用越强.此外,本文还发现媒体的权威性、报道内容的专业性增强了外部审计对盈余管理的抑制作用.本文研究表明媒体负面报道能通过审计师途径实现公司治理作用,治理效果受媒体的性质和报道内容影响.

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