It is a common phenomenon that entrepreneur and venture capitalists have conflict with control rights. In order to solve this problem,in this paper,we analyze the control mode between entrepreneurs and venture cap-italists and the process of the strategies they select in controlling the game,and by applying the method of repli-cator dynamics,we find that:(1)the result is that joint control or camera control is stable strategy when entre-preneurs and venture capitalists choose whether to fight for control.(2)when the successful probability of the project,and residual claims the venture capitalist to obtain increase,they converge in the control,whereas they decrease,they converge in the camera control;when the probability of success of the project is more than 50%, the reduction in the fixed income converge in the joint control,start-up enterprises' increased output converges in the joint control,and if not,it converges in the camera control.Finally,the model conclusions are tested by the CV Source database sample data,and the results are in agreement with the main conclusions of the theoreti-cal model.The conclusion is of certain practical significance for guiding the rational choice of the mode of control right of the enterprise in China.%创业企业家和风险投资家因为控制权模式不合理所导致的矛盾在我国普遍存在.为解决该问题,本文通过研究创业企业家与风险投资家在博弈过程中的控制权策略选择及由此决定的控制权模式,运用演化博弈理论中复制动态的方法分析发现:(1)创业企业家和风险投资家在选择是否争取控制权的博弈结果是联合控制或相机控制;(2)项目成功概率、风险投资家获取的剩余索取权增加时收敛于联合控制,反之则收敛于相机控制;当项目成功的概率大于50%时,固定收益减少收敛于联合控制,创业企业产出增加收敛于联合控制,反则收敛于相机控制.最后,通过CV Source数据库样本数据对模型结论进行了实证检验,检验结果与理论模型的主要结论相一致.研究结论对于指导我国创业企业控制权模式合理选择具有一定的实践意义.
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