By making an introduction of fairness preference into the traditional VMI model , the mechanism is dis-cussed of how fairness preference impacts the performance of supply chain .Boundary conditions of fairness pref-erence are revealed by establishing a Stackelberg gaming model .It is pointed out that 1)there’s a‘price thresh-old’, and when sales price is higher(lower)than the threshold, supplier will(won’t)have fairness negative utili-ty;2)the value of‘price threshold’ has a positive correlation with retailer ’s channel power;3)when sales price is higher than the ‘price threshold’, fairness negative utility will firstly get higher and then lower as the supplier has an increasing degree of jealousy;4)fairness preference aggravates the double marginal effect in the supply chain.Finally, the effectiveness of conclusions has been verified by numerical examples .% 将公平偏好引入传统VMI模型之中，探讨供应商的公平偏好对供应链各成员及整体产生影响的机理。通过建立主导零售商与供应商间的Stackelberg博弈，揭示了公平偏好起作用的边界条件，研究指出：1）存在一个价格阀值，使得当产品的销售价格高于（低于）该阀值时，供应商产生（不产生）公平负效用；2）阀值的高低与零售商的渠道力量呈正相关关系；3）当销售价格高于阀值时，供应商的公平负效用会随自身嫉妒心理强度的增强而先减小后变大；4）供应商的公平偏好会加剧供应链内的双重边际效应。最后，数值分析验证了结论的有效性。
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