An incentive mechanism of scarce resources supply in cluster supply chain is studied. Given some kind of spare parts short in market and the output of manufacturer directly related with is the spare part supply quantity , which directly related with the effort level of the first-level suppliers, corresponding models based on bilevel programming have been established to study the incentive mechanism. Cases of the suppliers cooperation and non-cooperation are studied separately. Finally this paper has carried out a simulation, and the results indicated that the incentive mechanism can drive the suppliers well and guards against the supplier cooperation effectively.%对存在多级供应商的集群式供应链中稀缺资源供应的激励问题进行了研究.在假设市场某种零部件稀缺,制造商的产量直接与零部件供应量链相关,而零部件供应量直接与一级供应商努力程度相关的情况下,建立了相应的单多双层规划模型,分别研究了制造商针对供应商结盟与不结盟的情况下的最优激励机制.最后进行了仿真,结果表明本文的激励机制能较好激励供应商并能有效防范其结盟.
展开▼
