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生态经济视角下政府企业污染治理的演化博弈分析

         

摘要

本文分析生态经济视角下政府环境监测部门与企业在污染治理过程中的博弈行为。首先分析完全信息静态博弈分析的纳什均衡,然后扩展到群体有限理性下博弈分析,建立了政府监管部门和企业在各自不同的策略选择时的成本和收益函数,运用演化博弈理论研究了博弈模型的稳定性策略。分析结果表明:政府部门应该对企业污染加大监管及惩罚力度;企业应该运用更高的科技水平来降低污染物的产生及污染治理成本;加大政府监管失职处罚,强化政府监管职责;完善环境监管机制,提高政府监管效率,减少监管部门对于企业的监管成本。%This paper analyses ecological economic environment government environmental monitoring depart-ments and enterprises behavior in pollution control in the process of playing the Game. Firstly, the paper analyses the complete information static game theory of Nash equilibrium;and then the paper extends to bounded rationality of game analysis, establishing the government environmental protection department and the enterprises in different strategies when the choice of cost and revenue functions. By using the evolutionary game theory, the paper studies the game model of the stability of the strategy. The game analysis results show that the government should strengthen su-pervision and punishment of enterprise pollution;enterprises should use a higher level of science and technology to reduce the pollutants and the pollution control cost;punishment regulation dereliction of duty should be increased, and government regulatory responsibilities should be improved;the environmental monitoring mechanism should be updated, by improving the efficiency of government regulation, and reducing the cost of monitoring.

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