首页> 中文期刊> 《科技管理研究》 >三寡头垄断市场中内部创新企业专利许可问题研究

三寡头垄断市场中内部创新企业专利许可问题研究

         

摘要

This thesis aims at the three oligopoly market,considering the possibility of the competitive company’s invest-ment for researching new technology.Using the game model,analyze the patent licensing problem about the inside innova-tive business facing two companies with different competitive capacity in the market.Suppose the marginal cost of the inside innovative company and the competitive company takes a common value,the research shows that the inside innovative com-pany licenses its technology to the disadvantaged enterprise,and the competitive company also enters the industry through making investment to research new technology,the patent licensing may decrease the marketing gross profit and social wel-fare;The inside innovative company licenses its technology to the disadvantaged enterprise,and it deters the competitive company from entering the industry,the impact of patent licensing?brings to the marketing gross profit and social welfare will be decided by the required inputcost that the disadvantaged enterprise needs for the commercialization of patented tech-nology and the required amount of investment that the competitive company needs for researching new technology.%针对三寡头垄断市场,考虑竞争能力较强企业投资研发新技术的可能性,对内部创新企业面对不同竞争能力的两个在位企业时的专利许可问题进行博弈分析。在内部创新企业与竞争能力较强企业的边际成本相同的情况下,研究表明:当专利许可不能阻止竞争能力较强企业投资研发新技术时,将降低市场总利润及社会福利;反之,专利许可对市场总利润及社会福利的影响由弱势企业将专利技术商业化所需投入成本与竞争能力较强企业研发新技术所需投资额的大小共同决定。

著录项

相似文献

  • 中文文献
  • 外文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号