首页> 中文期刊> 《价值工程》 >不完全信息条件下PPP项目公私共担型风险分配的博弈模型

不完全信息条件下PPP项目公私共担型风险分配的博弈模型

         

摘要

PPP项目是未来城市基础设施建设的主要方向,合理的风险分配直接影响PPP项目的发展。从风险的承担方来看,可分为单方承担和公私共担。本文结合PPP项目不完全信息的实际情形,运用讨价还价博弈理论,分别构建了公私双方地位对称和地位非对称下PPP项目共担型风险分配的讨价还价博弈模型,并且得出两种情况下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡。该文的研究成果不仅在理论上丰富了PPP项目风险分配的研究,而且对促进PPP项目的发展也具有一定的现实意义。%PPP model is becoming an important development direction for the city infrastructure construction, rational risk allocation will influence the development of PPP projects directly. From risk undertaker's perspective, unilateral risk and joint risk can be divided. This paper combines the realistic incomplete information status and uses bargaining game theory to respectively constructe the bargaining game model of joint risk allocation under symmetry of status and asymmetry of status and find the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. This paper not only enriches the theory research of the risk allocation of PPP project,but also has some meanings in promoting the development of PPP project.

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