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Game Theory Model of Traffic Participants within Amber Time at Signalized Intersection

机译:信号交叉口琥珀色时间内交通参与者的博弈模型

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摘要

The traffic light scheme is composed of red, green, and amber lights, and it has been defined clearly for the traffic access of red and green lights; however, the definition of that for the amber light is indistinct, which leads to the appearance of uncertainty factors and serious traffic conflicts during the amber light. At present, the traffic administrations are faced with the decision of whether to forbid passing or not during the amber light in the cities of China. On one hand, it will go against the purpose of setting amber lights if forbidding passing; on the other hand, it may lead to a mess of traffic flow running if not. And meanwhile the drivers are faced with the decision of passing the intersection or stopping during the amber light as well. So the decision-making behavior of traffic administrations and drivers can be converted into a double game model. And through quantification of their earnings in different choice conditions, the optimum decision-making plan under specific conditions could be solved via the Nash equilibrium solution concept. Thus the results will provide a basis for the formulation of the traffic management strategy.
机译:交通信号灯方案由红色,绿色和琥珀色的灯组成,并且已明确定义用于交通信号灯的红色和绿色。但是,对于琥珀色灯的定义并不清楚,这导致出现不确定性因素,并且在琥珀色灯期间出现严重的交通冲突。目前,在中国城市,交通管理部门面临着是否在琥珀色灯光下禁止通过的决定。一方面,如果禁止通过,它将违反设置琥珀色灯光的目的。另一方面,如果不这样做,可能会导致混乱的交通流。同时,驾驶员也面临着在琥珀色灯光下通过交叉路口或停车的决定。因此,交通管理和驾驶员的决策行为可以转换为双重博弈模型。通过量化他们在不同选择条件下的收益,可以通过纳什均衡解决方案概念来解决特定条件下的最优决策计划。因此,结果将为制定交通管理策略提供基础。

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