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Present self-represented futures of value are a reason for the wrongness of killing

机译:当前自我代表的价值期货是杀人的错误原因

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摘要

In Marquis's recent paper he has not satisfactorily shown that killing does not adversely affect the victim's present self-represented desires for their future. Marquis is correct in believing life and death are distinct, but living and dying are not. In fact, to use a well-known saying, "the second we are born we start to die". During the process of dying, whether it be long as in over our lifetime or short as in as we are being killed, there comes a point when the present realistic desires we have we know will never be satisfied. This is why killing can be wrong. This would imply killing an unconscious person, infant, or fetus cannot be wrong. But such killing can be wrong, despite the person killed not experiencing the desire not to be killed as he was dying. Killing can be wrong because others can have a present self-represented desire for that person not to be killed to have been killed. If this line of reasoning is correct, then the "best interests" principle often applied to life and death considerations regarding unconscious persons, infants, and fetuses, is invalid, as such human beings do not have present desires. All that matters is what relevant others rationally desire, after being informed of the facts and the consequences, for that unconscious person, infant or fetus.
机译:在马奎斯(Marquis)的最新论文中,他没有令人满意地表明,杀戮不会对受害人目前对自己未来的自我代表的愿望产生不利影响。侯爵认为生与死是截然不同的是正确的,但生与死却没有。实际上,用一句著名的谚语说:“我们出生的第二天,我们开始死亡”。在死亡的过程中,无论是一生中的长久,还是被杀死时的短暂,总有一天我们所知道的现实愿望永远无法满足。这就是为什么杀人可能是错误的原因。这意味着杀死失去知觉的人,婴儿或胎儿是不对的。但是,尽管被杀者没有经历过要死时不被杀的愿望,但这种杀戮可能是错误的。杀人可能是错误的,因为其他人现在可能表现出自己渴望不被杀的人被杀的愿望。如果这种推理方法是正确的,那么通常针对无意识的人,婴儿和胎儿的生死考量采用的“最大利益”原则是无效的,因为这样的人没有当前的欲望。重要的是相关人员在被告知事实和后果之后,对于那个失去知觉的人,婴儿或胎儿的理性期望。

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