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An evolutionarily stable strategy and the critical point of hog futures trading entities based on replicator dynamic theory: 2006–2015 data for China’s 22 provinces

机译:基于复制者动态理论的进化稳定策略和生猪期货交易实体的临界点:中国22个省的2006–2015年数据

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摘要

Although frequent fluctuations in domestic hog prices seriously affect the stability and robustness of the hog supply chain, hog futures (an effective hedging instrument) have not been listed in China. To better understand hog futures market hedging, it is important to study the steady state of intersubjective bidding. This paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct a game model between hedgers and speculators in the hog futures market, and replicator dynamic equations are then used to obtain the steady state between the two trading entities. The results show that the steady state is one in which hedgers adopt a “buy” strategy and speculators adopt a “do not speculate” strategy, but this type of extreme steady state is not easily realized. Thus, to explore the rational proportion of hedgers and speculators in the evolutionary stabilization strategy, bidding processes were simulated using weekly average hog prices from 2006 to 2015, such that the conditions under which hedgers and speculators achieve a steady state could be analyzed. This task was performed to achieve the stability critical point, and we show that only when the value of λ is satisfied and the conditions of hog futures price changes and futures price are satisfied can hedgers and speculators achieve a rational proportion and a stable hog futures market. This market can thus provide a valuable reference for the development of the Chinese hog futures market and the formulation and guidance of relevant departmental policies.
机译:尽管国内生猪价格的频繁波动严重影响了生猪供应链的稳定性和稳健性,但生猪期货(一种有效的对冲工具)尚未在中国上市。为了更好地了解生猪期货市场的套期保值,研究主体间竞标的稳定状态非常重要。本文运用进化博弈理论构建了生猪期货市场中套期保值者与投机者之间的博弈模型,然后利用复制者动态方程式获得了两个交易实体之间的稳态。结果表明,稳态是套期保值者采取“买入”策略而投机者采用“不进行投机”策略的状态,但是这种极端的稳态并不容易实现。因此,为了探索套期保值者和投机者在进化稳定策略中的合理比例,使用2006年至2015年的每周平均生猪价格模拟了招标过程,从而可以分析套期保值者和投机者达到稳定状态的条件。执行此任务是为了达到稳定的临界点,我们证明只有满足λ的值并且满足生猪期货价格变化和期货价格的条件,套期保值者和投机者才能达到合理的比例和稳定的生猪期货市场。因此,该市场可以为中国生猪期货市场的发展以及相关部门政策的制定和指导提供有价值的参考。

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  • 年(卷),期 -1(12),2
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  • 页码 e0172009
  • 总页数 18
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