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首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health >An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China
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An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

机译：集约化管理模式下农业面源污染控制的多主体协同治理演化博弈模型

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This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.
机译：本文重点研究了集约化管理模式下中国农业生产可持续发展的困境，这一问题受到农业面源污染的严重挑战。有效突破这一难题的关键是促进利益相关者（包括地方政府，新的农业经营者和传统农民）共同控制农业面源污染。因此，本文在地方政府的指导下，通过建立三边进化博弈模型，分析了进化合作的稳定性策略，并实现了不同演化过程的模拟，探讨了新型农业经营者与传统农民之间的互动决策关系。 MATLAB编写的场景。结果表明，新的农业经营者在农业面源污染控制中起着主导作用，其策略具有技术溢出效应。上级政府的奖励将支持地方政府在农业面源污染控制的共同治理中采取积极行动，然后地方政府可以向新的农业经营者和传统农民提供技术支持和补贴，以降低其成本。此外，本文还发现，各组之间存在绿色协同效应，其中一组参数和策略的变化会影响另外两个。此外，农业土地经营权的转让将使传统农民花更多的时间在农业面源污染控制的共同治理中进行合作。为了在集约化管理模式下促进农业面源污染控制的多主体共同治理，本文提出有必要降低其成本并提高激励机制，并增加群体间的共同利益。并增强其绿色协同效应。

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