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首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health >Optimal Decisions for Two Risk-Averse Competitive Manufacturers under the Cap-and-Trade Policy and Uncertain Demand
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Optimal Decisions for Two Risk-Averse Competitive Manufacturers under the Cap-and-Trade Policy and Uncertain Demand

机译：总量管制和交易不确定条件下两个规避风险的竞争制造商的最优决策

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摘要

With the increasingly serious problem of environmental pollution, reducing carbon emissions has become an urgent task for all countries. The cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has gained international recognition and has been adopted by several countries. In this paper, considering the uncertainty of market demand, we discuss the carbon emission reduction and price policies of two risk-averse competitive manufacturers under the C&T policy. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: simultaneous decision making and sequential decision making. Two models were constructed for these behaviors. The optimal decisions, carbon emission reduction rate, and price were obtained from these two models. Furthermore, in this paper the effects of some key parameters on the optimal decision are discussed, and some managerial insights are obtained. The results show that the lower the manufacturers’ risk aversion level is, the higher their carbon emission reduction rate and utilities. As the carbon quota increases, the manufacturers’ optimal carbon reduction rate and utilities increase. Considering consumers’ environmental awareness, it is more beneficial for the government to reduce the carbon quota and motivate manufacturers’ internal enthusiasm for emission reduction. The government can, through macro control of the market, make carbon trading prices increase appropriately and encourage manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions.
机译：随着环境污染问题的日益严重，减少碳排放已成为所有国家的当务之急。总量管制与交易（C＆T）政策已获得国际认可，并已被多个国家采用。本文考虑市场需求的不确定性，讨论了在科技政策下两个规避风险的竞争性制造商的碳减排和价格政策。两家制造商有两种竞争行为：同步决策和顺序决策。针对这些行为构建了两个模型。从这两个模型获得了最佳决策，碳减排率和价格。此外，本文讨论了一些关键参数对最优决策的影响，并获得了一些管理上的见解。结果表明，制造商的风险规避度越低，其碳减排率和实用性就越高。随着碳配额的增加，制造商的最佳碳减排率和效用将增加。考虑到消费者的环保意识，政府减少碳配额和激发制造商内部减排的热情更加有益。政府可以通过对市场的宏观调控，使碳交易价格适当提高，并鼓励制造商减少碳排放。

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