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首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health >An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism
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An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

机译：考虑中国政府奖励罚款机制绿色发展绩效的建设与拆迁废弃物回收的进化博弈论研究

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The low efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling has restricted the green development of China’s construction industry. Additionally, the government’s reward–penalty mechanism has a huge influence on green development. This study aimed to investigate the effect of green development performance (GDP) and the government’s reward–penalty mechanism on the decision-making process of production and recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Therefore, the strategies’ evolutionary paths of production and recycling units were investigated by using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, an evolutionary game model between production units and recycling units was proposed under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios were discussed. Finally, the effects of the relevant parameters on the evolutionary paths of the game model were analyzed using numerical simulations. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) When the range of GDP changes, the evolutionary stable strategy changes accordingly. GDP plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality development of the CDW recycling supply chain, but an increase in GDP can easily lead to the simultaneous motivation of free-riding. (2) The government’s reward–penalty mechanism effectively regulates the decision-making process of production and recycling units. An increase in the subsidy rate and supervision probability helps to reduce free-riding behavior. Moreover, the incentive effect of the subsidy probability on recycling units is more obvious, while the effect of the supervision probability on improving the motivation of active participation for production units is more remarkable. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis to ensure production and recycling units to make optimal strategy choices under different conditions but also provides a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable reward–penalty mechanism that is conducive to a macro-control market.
机译：闭环供应链在施工和拆迁废物（CDW）回收中的低效率限制了中国建筑业的绿色发展。此外，政府的奖励罚款机制对绿色发展有巨大影响。本研究旨在调查绿色发展绩效（GDP）和政府对生产和回收单位决策过程的影响，以及揭示不同条件下的最佳策略。因此，使用进化博弈论研究了策略的生产和回收单位的进化路径。首先，在政府的奖励惩罚机制下提出了生产单位与回收单位之间的进化游戏模型。然后，讨论了不同情景中的进化稳定性策略。最后，使用数值模拟分析了相关参数对游戏模型进化路径的影响。主要结论如下。 （1）当GDP变化的范围时，进化稳定的策略相应地改变。 GDP在促进CDW回收供应链的高质量发展方面发挥了积极作用，但GDP的增加很容易导致自由骑行的同时动力。 （2）政府的奖励罚款机制有效规范生产和回收单位的决策过程。补贴率和监督概率的增加有助于减少自由骑行行为。此外，补贴概率对回收单位的激励效应更为明显，而监督概率对提高生产单位积极参与动机的影响更为显着。本文不仅提供了决策，确保生产和回收单位在不同条件下做出最佳的策略选择，而且还为政府提供了合理奖励罚款机制，为政府提供了有利于宏观调控市场的合理奖励机制。

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