• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 美国卫生研究院文献>Springer Open Choice >Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games
【2h】

Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games

机译：生态剧场和进化博弈：环境和人口因素如何决定进化博弈的收益

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务，本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文，但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁，仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况，如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of “costs” and “benefits”, there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure “benefit” or “cost”? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic “cost” versus “benefits”, is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of trade-offs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk–Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced.
机译：在进化游戏和复制者动力学的标准方法中，适应度的差异可以解释为人口中平均马尔萨斯增长率的过度。在与“成本”和“收益”分析相关的基础推理中，有一个无声的假设，即适合性可以用某种类型的单位来描述。但是，在大多数情况下，没有明确指定这些度量单位。然后出现了一个问题：这些理论是否可以验证？我们如何衡量“收益”或“成本”？人口统计学是一种自然语言，对描述战略性“成本”与“利益”进行比较并证明其合理性很有用，因为决定自然选择结果的基本事件是生与死。在本文中，我们介绍了在进化博弈理论框架中对生与死进行明确分析的结果。我们将研究不同类型的死亡率压力，它们的组合以及死亡率和生育率之间权衡的可能性。我们将证明，在这种新方法中，可以建模严格的生态因素（例如密度依赖性和加性背景适应性）（在经典理论中似乎是中性的）如何影响游戏的结果。我们以Hawk-Dove博弈为例，并表明当按照我们的新方法重新制定时，会产生新的细节和新的生物学预测。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
代理获取

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号