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Goodwill Impairment: The Effects of Public Enforcement and Monitoring by Institutional Investors

机译：商誉减损：机构投资者对公共执法和监督的影响

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摘要

This study investigates the determinants of goodwill impairment decisions by firms applying IFRS based on a comprehensive sample of stock-listed firms from 21 countries. Multivariate logistical regression findings indicate that goodwill impairment incidence is negatively associated with economic performance, but also related to proxies for managerial and firm-level incentives. In addition, whereas goodwill impairment tends to be timely for firms in high enforcement countries, firms in low enforcement countries tend to be less responsive to declines in the economic value of goodwill; CEO compensation concerns affect the impairment decision for firms in low enforcement; and CEO reputation concerns and management preference for smooth earnings influence goodwill impairment decisions in high, as well as low, enforcement countries. We also find that private monitoring through institutional investors substitutes for public enforcement in the context of goodwill impairment when a country's enforcement regime is relatively weak.
机译：这项研究基于来自21个国家/地区的股票上市公司的全面样本，研究了采用IFRS的公司商誉减值决定的决定因素。多元逻辑回归结果表明，商誉减损发生率与经济绩效负相关，但也与管理和企业级激励的代理相关。此外，尽管商誉减损对于高执行国家的公司而言是及时的，但低执行国家的公司对商誉的经济价值下降的响应往往较弱； CEO薪酬问题影响了执法不力的公司的减值决定；首席执行官的声誉问题和管理层对平稳收入的偏好会影响到高执行国家和低执行国家的商誉减损决定。我们还发现，在一个国家的执行制度相对薄弱的情况下，在商誉减损的背景下，通过机构投资者进行的私人监督可以代替公共执行。

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