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Syndicate Size and the Choice of Covenants in Debt Contracts

机译：辛迪加的规模和债务合同中契约的选择

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I investigate whether and how syndicate size influences the type of covenants used in debt contracts. Prior theory and evidence suggest renegotiation considerations from coordination difficulties in large syndicates and intertemporal transfers due to relationship lending in small syndicates are factors in the design of covenants. I find that for large syndicates, borrowers and lenders avoid the use of flexibility-reducing covenants that are more likely to impact negatively on value-enhancing corporate policies in good states of the world. This effect becomes stronger when the borrower has fewer outside financing options. Additionally, I find contracts with large syndicates are more likely to have more covenant slack, include performance pricing provisions, have tailored capital expenditure covenants, and principally rely on covenants that are directly linked to the current performance of the borrower. Collectively, these results imply that syndicate size and related renegotiation considerations affect how accounting information is used in debt contracts.
机译：我研究了银团的规模是否以及如何影响债务合同中使用的契约类型。先前的理论和证据表明，由于大型集团的协调困难而进行的重新协商考虑以及由于小型集团的关系贷款而造成的跨期转移是设计契约的因素。我发现，对于大型集团而言，借款人和贷方应避免使用降低灵活性的盟约，这些盟约更可能会对世界上处于良好状态的增值公司政策产生负面影响。当借款人的外部融资选择较少时，这种影响会增强。此外，我发现大型集团的合同更有可能出现契约松弛，包括绩效定价条款，量身定制的资本支出契约，并且主要依赖与借款人当前绩效直接相关的契约。总的来说，这些结果表明，集团规模和相关的重新谈判考虑因素会影响在债务合同中使用会计信息的方式。

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