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首页> 外文期刊>The accounting review >Can Employees Exercise Control Over Managers? The Role of the Employees' Knowledge of Manager Behavior and Manager Discretion
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Can Employees Exercise Control Over Managers? The Role of the Employees' Knowledge of Manager Behavior and Manager Discretion

机译：员工可以控制经理人吗？ 员工对经理行为和经理自行决识的作用

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摘要

I investigate whether organizations can use the "power of the employee'' to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact on reducing managers' opportunistic behavior when managers have discretion over employee rewards versus when they do not. I further predict that the effect of employee-based control depends on whether managers are other-interested versus self-interested. Revealing manager actions alone is sufficient to reduce other-interested managers' opportunism, even when they lack discretion over employee rewards. Revealing manager actions alone has no discernible influence on self-interested managers' opportunism, but pairing this action with granting them discretion over employee compensation does reduce their opportunism. Results of two experiments support my predictions, and these results have important implications. By relying on the power of the employee, organizations can induce (even selfish) managers to act less opportunistically.
机译：我调查组织是否可以使用“雇员权力”，将管理人员的机会主义行为降低到他人。我预测向员工揭示这种行为使管理人员倾向于机会地行动。员工的知识对减少管理人员有更强烈的影响当管理人员没有酌情奖励与员工奖励而酌情相比，我进一步预测了基于员工的控制的影响取决于管理者是否是其他感兴趣的与自我感兴趣。仅揭示经理行动就足以减少其他兴趣管理者的机会主义，即使他们缺乏员工奖励。单独揭示经理行动对自体兴趣管理人员的机会主义没有可辨别的影响，而是将这种行动与授予员工薪酬的自由裁量权相结合，确实减少了他们的机会主义。两个实验支持的结果我的预测，这些结果具有重要意义。B y依靠员工的权力，组织可以诱导（甚至自私）管理者机会行动。

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