• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Acta Analytica >On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism
【24h】

On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism

机译：认知内在论与内容外在论的相容性

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the two worlds are subjectively indistinguishable for them, which is what matters on internalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that even if a standard moral of the New Evil Genius intuition is untenable due to considerations arising from content externalism, the case can be understood as supporting epistemic internalism in a way that is wholly compatible with content externalism. In short, epistemic internalism is committed to sameness of justificatory status between subjectively indistinguishable counterparts, not sameness of content of their justifiers.
机译：在本文中，我考虑了蒂莫西·威廉姆森（Timothy Williamson）的最近论点，即认知内在主义与内容外在主义确实是不相容的，并且由于他认为内容外在主义无可非议，所以对于认知内在主义来说更糟。但是，我认为，无论哪种内容观都是正确的，正确理解的认知内在主义仍然不受影响。新邪恶天才思想实验的关键在于，鉴于居民有意识地了解了所有这些东西，这两个世界在主观上对他们是无法区分的，这在认识论理由的内部主义解释上很重要。我认为，即使由于内容外在主义引起的考虑而使新邪恶天才直觉的标准道德无法维持，该案也可以理解为以与内容外在主义完全兼容的方式支持认知内在主义。简而言之，认知内在主义致力于主观上无法区分的对应者之间的正当地位的相同，而不是其称谓内容的相同。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号