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Epistemic Risk and Relativism

机译:认知风险和相对主义

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摘要

It is generally assumed that there are (at least) two fundamental epistemic goals: believing truths, and avoiding the acceptance of falsehoods. As has been often noted, these goals are in conflict with one another. Moreover, the norms governing rational belief that we should derive from these two goals depend on how we weight them relative to one another. However, it is not obvious that there is one objectively correct weighting for everyone in all circumstances. Indeed, as I shall argue, it looks as though there are circumstances in which a range of possible weightings of the two goals are all equally epistemically rational.
机译:通常假定(至少)有两个基本的认识论目标:相信真理,避免接受虚假陈述。人们经常注意到,这些目标相互冲突。此外,指导我们应该从这两个目标中得出的理性信念的准则取决于我们如何相互权衡它们。但是,在任何情况下,每个人都没有客观正确的权重是显而易见的。确实,正如我将要论证的那样,似乎在某些情况下,这两个目标的各种可能权重都在认识论上都是同样合理的。

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