首页> 外文期刊>Acta Analytica >Thought Structure, Belief Content, and Possession Conditions
【24h】

Thought Structure, Belief Content, and Possession Conditions

机译:思想结构,信念内容和占有条件

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental. They individuate the propositions and thoughts containing them, which in turn individuate the propositional attitudes that are relations to those propositions or thoughts.
机译:根据Peacocke的说法,概念通过其拥有条件来区分,这些条件是根据相信包含这些概念的某些命题的条件来指定的。作为支持,孔雀试图解释一种思想具有一种结构是什么,以及一种信念具有命题内容是什么。我证明了拥有条件理论不能回答这些基本问题。孔雀的理论创始人,因为概念是形而上学的基础。它们使包含它们的命题和思想个性化,从而又使与那些命题或思想有关系的命题态度个性化。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号