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Promise as Practice Reason

机译：承诺作为实践理由

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To promise someone to do something is to commit oneself to that person to do that thing, but what does that commitment consist of? Some think a promissory commitment is an obligation to do what’s promised, and that while promising practices facilitate the creation of promissory obligations, they are not essential to them. I favor the broadly Humean view in which, when it comes to promises (and so promissory obligations), practices are of the essence. I propose the Practice Reason Account of promises, according to which a promise is basically to give oneself a self-interested practice reason to do what’s promised. One achieves this feat by invoking self-enforcing independent practice rules thanks to which one’s doing what’s promised preserves one’s promissory trust(worthiness) and promising power. However, nothing in this account supports the Hume-Rawls claim that promise-keeping or promise-breaking is right just when and because it conforms to practice rules that are justified by their good- or right-making properties.
机译：承诺某人做某事就是承诺自己去做某事，但是这种承诺包括什么呢？一些人认为，期许承诺是履行承诺的义务，尽管有前途的做法可以促进期许义务的创建，但对他们来说并不是必需的。我赞成广泛的休曼观点，在这种观点中，当涉及到承诺（以及承诺义务）时，实践至关重要。我提出了“承诺的实践原因说明”，根据该承诺，承诺基本上就是给自己一个符合自身利益的实践理由，以履行承诺。一个人通过援引自我执行的独立练习规则来实现这一壮举，因此，一个人按照所承诺的去做可以保留一个人的期许信任（价值）和有希望的力量。但是，此帐户中没有任何内容支持休ume-罗尔斯（Hume-Rawls）的说法，即承诺和违反承诺只是在正确的时间和正确的时机，因为它符合以其良好或正确制定的​​属性为依据的实践规则。

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