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首页> 外文期刊>IIE Transactions >Adoption Of Cost-reducing Technology By Asymmetric Duopolists In Stochastically Evolving Markets
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Adoption Of Cost-reducing Technology By Asymmetric Duopolists In Stochastically Evolving Markets

机译：随机发展的市场中不对称双寡头采用降低成本的技术

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This work considers the adoption of technology that will reduce unit production costs by one or two players sharing a single market. Three models are developed involving a monopolist, a Stackelberg game with two firms and a designated order of adoption, and an open loop game with no prespecified order of adoption. In the "two-firm" cases the firms are allowed to differ in per unit production costs both before and after technology adoption, as well as the capital outlay required for adoption. In each setting, an evolution of market size is manifested by the level of an exogenous parameter which evolves according to geometric Brownian motion. Structural and numerical results are presented that help to explain the logic and optimal timing of technology adoption. The inclusion of cost and investment level asymmetry leads to a variety of cases. In some instances the high-cost firm is the first to adopt, and adopts at the point that maximizes its profits. In other cases, the higher-cost firm is the first to adopt but the timing of its adoption is dictated by the threat that its rival can make a pre-emptive move. In some cases the lower-cost firm does pre-empt its higher-cost rival and it is optimal for the higher-cost firm to sit idle while this happens. Such an outcome is possible even when both firms have the same per unit production costs after adoption. This work expands on existing literature in that it is the first to consider output rate selection, pricing decisions and technology investments in a continuous time framework while considering a real deferral option and asymmetric players.
机译：这项工作考虑采用能够减少一个或两个共享单个市场参与者的单位生产成本的技术。开发了三种模型，包括垄断者，有两家公司的Stackelberg游戏和指定的采用顺序以及没有预先指定采用顺序的开环游戏。在“两个公司”的情况下，允许企业在采用技术之前和之后的单位生产成本以及采用技术所需的资本支出方面有所不同。在每种情况下，市场规模的演变都由根据几何布朗运动演化的外生参数的水平来体现。给出了结构和数值结果，有助于解释技术采用的逻辑和最佳时机。成本和投资水平的不对称性导致各种情况。在某些情况下，高成本公司是第一个采用这种方法的公司，并且采用的是最大化利润的方法。在其他情况下，成本更高的公司是第一个采用的公司，但采用它的时间是由其竞争对手可能采取先发制人的威胁所决定的。在某些情况下，成本较低的公司会抢占其成本较高的竞争对手，因此，成本较高的公司最好在这种情况下保持闲置状态。即使两家公司采用后的单位生产成本相同，这种结果也是可能的。这项工作是在现有文献的基础上扩展的，因为它是第一个在连续时间框架内考虑产出率选择，定价决策和技术投资，同时考虑真正的递延期权和不对称参与者的方法。

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