Reading Peter Dunn's critique of tactics in general and the ECM tactics of 1966 in particular, I have to say that whatever was going on in 1966 improved by the time I got to the 42nd TEWS, then flying EB-66s at Korat in 1971-72 ["Letters: Lessons Not Learned," October, p. 8]. I wish I had kept a diary. Forty years have passed so I don't recall the details, but I do recall that our EWOs didn't bother jamming long-range surveillance/GCI radars; they were too far away for jamming to be effective. Instead, the focus was on short-range and terminal threats: SA-2 guidance, gun laying radars (when they were athreat), height finding radars, fighter attack/intercept (Al) radars, and some communications. Jamming was selective, so I doubt that any friendly GCI site ever saw any jamming, unless by accident.
展开▼
