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Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives

机译:动态非货币激励

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We study a principal-agent interaction where investments and rewards arrive stochastically over time and are privately observed by the agent. Investments (costly for the agent, beneficial for the principal) can be concealed by the agent. Rewards (beneficial for the agent, costly for the principal) can be forbidden by the principal. We ask how rewards should be used and which investments incentivized. We identify the unique optimal mechanism and analyze the dynamic investment and compensation policies. When all rewards are identical, the unique optimal way to provide incentives is by a "carte blanche" to pursue all rewards arriving in a predetermined time frame.
机译:我们研究了委托与代理之间的互动,其中投资和报酬随时间随机到达,并由代理私人观察。代理可以隐瞒投资(对代理而言成本高昂,对委托人有利)。奖励(对于代理人而言是有益的,对于委托人而言是昂贵的)可以被委托人禁止。我们问应如何使用奖励以及激励哪些投资。我们确定独特的最佳机制,并分析动态的投资和补偿政策。当所有奖励都相同时,提供奖励的唯一最佳方法是通过“ carte blanche”来追求在预定时间范围内到达的所有奖励。

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