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首页> 外文期刊>American economic journal >Impressionable Voters
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Impressionable Voters

机译：印象是的选民

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摘要

We propose a model of impressionable voters. Impressionable voters vote based on impressions rather than maximizing expected utility. We apply our model to elections with multiple candidates and solve for the stationary distributions of the implied stochastic process. In elections with two candidates, we find that impressionable voters select the candidate that maximizes utilitarian welfare. In multi-candidate elections, Condorcet winners are elected provided that a majority of voters is able to sufficiently distinguish competing candidates. In such cases, models with impressionable voters may have better normative properties than models with rational voters.
机译：我们提出了一种夸张的选民的模型。印象宝贝选民基于印象，而不是最大化预期的效用。我们将模型应用于多个候选人的选举，并解决隐含随机过程的静止分布。在与两名候选人的选举中，我们发现屏蔽选民选择最大化功利主义福利的候选人。 In multi-candidate elections, Condorcet winners are elected provided that a majority of voters is able to sufficiently distinguish competing candidates.在这种情况下，具有可留下的选民的模型可能具有比具有理性选民的模型更好的规范性质。

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