首页> 外文期刊>American economic journal >Competition and Price Transparency in the Market for Lemons: Experimental Evidence
【24h】

Competition and Price Transparency in the Market for Lemons: Experimental Evidence

机译:柠檬市场的竞争与价格透明度:实验证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other's price offers. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable. We explore different behavioral explanations for the absence of a detrimental effect of price transparency. Remarkably, implementing the strategy method improves subjects' conditional reasoning, delivering the predicted loss in efficiency when offers are observable.
机译:在具有不对称信息的市场中,均衡往往低效,讨价还价可以帮助促进福利。 我们设计实验,以检查这些环境中竞争和价格透明度的影响。 与理论预测一致,我们发现竞争促进效率,如果替代者无法观察彼此的价格优惠。 然而,与预测相反,即使提供了可观察到的时间,竞争的效率增强效率仍然存在。 我们探讨了缺乏价格透明度的不利影响的不同行为解释。 值得注意的是,实施该策略方法可提高受试者的有条件推理,在提供的优惠时提供预测的损失。

著录项

  • 来源
    《American economic journal》 |2021年第2期|113-140|共28页
  • 作者单位

    Division of Social Science New York University Abu Dhabi Center for Behavioral Institutional Design (C-BID) New York University Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi PO Box 129188 United Arab Emirates;

    Naveen Jindal School of Management University of Texas at Dallas Richardson TX;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号