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Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

机译：没有新闻（被认为）坏消息？ 信息披露实验研究

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摘要

This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.
机译：本文采用实验室实验直接测试披露理论的中心预测：战略力量可以引导那些拥有私人信息的人自愿提供。 在一个简单的发件人 - 接收方游戏中，我们发现发件人披露有利信息，但拒绝不利的信息。 发件人扣留信息的程度与他们对接收者行动的表明信仰强烈相关，并且其声明的信仰平均准确。 接收者行动也与他们的信仰强烈相关，但他们的行为和信仰表明，许多人对在没有反复反馈的情况下对非挑剔的信息持怀疑态度。

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  • 来源
    《American economic journal》 |2021年第2期|141-173|共33页
  • 作者

    GINGER ZHE JIN; MICHAEL LUCA; DANIEL MARTIN;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park 3115 F Tydings Hall College Park MD 20742;

    Harvard Business School Soldiers Field Road Boston MA 02163;

    Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University 2211 Campus Drive Evanston IL 60208;

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