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首页> 外文期刊>Annals of nuclear energy >Analysis of single failure criteria and operator action effect for different SGTR mitigation strategies of HPR1000
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Analysis of single failure criteria and operator action effect for different SGTR mitigation strategies of HPR1000

机译：HPR1000的不同SGTR缓解策略的单一故障准则和操作员行动效果分析

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Establishment of a unified single failure criteria hypothesis and operator action for Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) accident in Deterministic Safety Analysis (DSA) is not an easy thing due to the complexity of the transient and the various operator actuations. Also, it's very difficult to finish leakage in 30 min without operator action. In HPR1000 type nuclear power plant design, two kinds of mitigation strategy to cope with SG overfill risk and radioactive release risk can be adopted. In this paper, behavior of HPR1000 under different operator actions and single failure criteria hypothesis for this two mitigation measures were investigated. System response featured by primary pressure, SG level, break mass flow rate, safety injection mass flow rate was obtained to investigate single failure criteria and operator manual intervention effect. For strategy 1, if VDA stuck open was chosen as single failure criteria, primary loop would be over cooled and accumulator safety injection would increase with more drastically fluctuation. In strategy 2, AFW isolation failure was chosen as single failure criteria from SG overfill risk aspect. Affected SG would overfill if AFW isolation failure lasting over 5 min. Combined manual PRZR spray and SIS termination can obtain faster depressurization and leakage termination rate within controllable core boiling and acceptable radioactive release in strategy 1. However, in Strategy 2, manual PRZR spray depressurization and manual SIS termination have little effect on accident mitigation due to VDA comparatively large cooling ability and early intervention. From T-H safety aspect after SGTR, operator manual intervention has more obvious effect in strategy 1 than in strategy 2, which can provide multiple redundant engineered safety features. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译：在确定性安全分析（DSA）中，要为蒸汽发生器爆裂（SGTR）事故建立统一的单一故障准则假设和操作员行动，由于瞬变过程的复杂性和各种操作员致动的复杂性，并非易事。另外，如果没有操作员的干预，在30分钟内完成泄漏非常困难。在HPR1000型核电站设计中，可以采用两种缓解策略来应对SG超填风险和放射性释放风险。本文研究了针对这两种缓解措施的HPR1000在不同操作员动作和单个故障准则假设下的行为。获得了以主压力，SG水平，中断质量流量，安全注射质量流量为特征的系统响应，以研究单个故障标准和操作员手动干预效果。对于策略1，如果将VDA保持打开状态作为单个故障标准，则主回路将过冷，而蓄能器安全注入将随着更大的波动而增加。在策略2中，从SG超填风险方面将AFW隔离故障选择为单个故障标准。如果AFW隔离故障持续5分钟以上，则受影响的SG将超填。策略1中结合使用手动PRZR喷雾和SIS终止可以在可控堆芯沸腾和可接受的放射性释放范围内获得更快的降压和泄漏终止速率。但是，在策略2中，由于VDA，手动PRZR喷雾降压和SIS手动终止对缓解事故几乎没有影响比较大的冷却能力和早期干预。从SGTR之后的T-H安全方面来看，操作员手动干预在策略1中比在策略2中具有更明显的效果，可以提供多个冗余的工程安全特性。 （C）2019 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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