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Political yardstick competition among Italian municipalities on spending decisions

机译：意大利市政当局在支出决策方面的政治准绳竞争

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摘要

We investigate the presence of political yardstick competition on current spending decisions in a sample of Italian municipalities. We find significant evidence of yardstick competition when we explicitly account for the domestic stability pact (DSP), a fiscal rule introduced to limit the budget deficit of local administrations. First, we estimate a static specification of a spatial panel model, and then we check for the robustness of our results with a dynamic specification. The static analysis shows that municipalities engage in yardstick competition during pre-election years, regardless of whether they are subject to the DSP or not. The dynamic analysis shows that the yardstick hypothesis remains robust only for municipalities not constrained by the DSP.
机译：我们在意大利城市样本中调查了针对当前支出决策的政治标尺竞争的存在。当我们明确说明国内稳定条约（DSP）时，就会发现大量的准绳竞争证据。DSP是为限制地方政府预算赤字而引入的一项财政规则。首先，我们估计空间面板模型的静态规格，然后使用动态规格检查结果的稳健性。静态分析表明，市政当局在大选前都参与了准绳竞争，无论它们是否受到DSP的约束。动态分析表明，只有在不受DSP约束的市政当局中，准绳假说仍然有效。

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  • 来源
    《The Annals of regional science》 |2012年第1期|p.213-235|共23页
  • 作者

    David Bartolini; Raffaella Santolini;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Economics, Polytechnic University of Marche,Piazzale Martelli, 8, 60121 Ancona, Italy;

    Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche nella Societa e nella Storia,University of Teramo, Campus di Colle Sant'Agostino, 64100 Teramo, Italy;

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