• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>The Antitrust Bulletin >The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total) Welfare Goal in Antitrust
【24h】

The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total) Welfare Goal in Antitrust

机译：反托拉斯中消费者（和总）福利目标背后的不合理理论

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This is the first installment of a two-part commentary on the New Brandeis School (the “New Brandeisians”) in Antitrust. In this first part, I examine why the New Brandeisians are correct to reject the consumer welfare standard. Instead of arguing, as the New Brandeisians do, that the consumer welfare standard leads to unacceptable outcomes, I argue that the consumer or total welfare standard was theoretically flawed and unrigorous from the start. My basic argument is that antitrust law addresses the impact of business strategies in markets where there are winners and losers. For example, in the classical exclusionary monopolist case, the monopolist’s conduct is enjoined to increase competition in the affected market or markets. As a result of the intervention, consumers benefit, but the monopolist is worse off. One hundred years of analysis by the welfare economists themselves shows that in such situations “welfare” or “consumer welfare” cannot be used as a reliable guide to assess the results of antitrust policy. Pareto Optimality does not apply in these situations because there are losers. Absent an ability to divine “cardinal utility” from observations of market behavior, other approaches such as consumer surplus, and compensating and equivalent variation cannot be coherently extended from the individual level to markets. The Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle that is in standard use in law and economics was created to address problems of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the existence of winners and losers. However, the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle is also inconsistent. Additional problems with the concept of welfare raised by philosophers, psychologists, and experimental economists are also considered. In light of this literature, the New Brandeisians are correct to reject Judge Bork’s original argument for adoption of the consumer welfare standard, but for deeper reasons than they have expressed thus far.
机译：这是对反托拉斯中的新布兰代斯学校（“新布兰代斯人”）的两部分评论的第一部分。在第一部分中，我研究了为什么新布兰迪西亚主义者正确拒绝消费者福利标准。我没有像新布兰迪西亚主义者那样争论消费者福利标准会导致不可接受的结果，我认为，消费者福利标准或总福利标准从一开始就存在理论上的缺陷和严格性。我的基本论点是，反托拉斯法解决了在有赢家和输家的市场中商业策略的影响。例如，在经典的排他性垄断者案例中，垄断者的行为受制于增加在受影响的一个或多个市场中的竞争。干预的结果是，消费者受益，但垄断者的境况更糟。福利经济学家自己进行的一百年分析表明，在这种情况下，“福利”或“消费者福利”不能用作评估反托拉斯政策结果的可靠指南。帕累托最优不适用于这些情况，因为有失败者。由于缺乏从市场行为观察中得出的“基本效用”的能力，其他方法（如消费者剩余，补偿和等效变化）无法从个人层面连贯地扩展到市场。在法律和经济学中标准使用的卡尔多-希克斯补偿原则的创建是为了解决效用的人际比较问题以及赢家和输家的存在。但是，Kaldor-Hicks补偿原理也不一致。还考虑了哲学家，心理学家和实验经济学家提出的福利概念的其他问题。根据这些文献，新布兰迪西亚主义者正确地拒绝了博克法官采用消费者福利标准的原始论点，但是出于比迄今为止表达的更深层次的原因。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号