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首页> 外文期刊>The Antitrust Bulletin >EU Merger Control and Harm to Innovation-A Long Walk to Freedom (from the Chains of Causation)
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EU Merger Control and Harm to Innovation-A Long Walk to Freedom (from the Chains of Causation)

机译：欧盟对创新的合并控制和危害-自由的漫漫长路（从因果关系链上）

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摘要

In a string of recent merger decisions, culminating in the Dow/DuPont case, the European Commission has profoundly revisited its traditional analysis of innovation and, ultimately, introduced what some authors have labeled “a novel theory of harm in EU merger policy.” According to this theory, the Commission does not look at harm to innovation on a specific product market in which parties are developing similar pipeline products, but adopts a general assessment of harm to innovation, unrelated to a specific product market and without considering potential anticompetitive effects on this basis. The purpose of this article is to show that over the last few years, the European Commission has been progressively departing from a “traditional” theory of harm in its assessment of mergers affecting innovation. In particular, we argue that the novel theory of harm developed in Dow/DuPont , based on a generic prejudice to innovation, is the landing place of a long journey through which the Commission has progressively altered the analytical framework applicable to traditional cases affecting pipeline products/potential competitors. And while this stance may be inspired by a legitimate policy goal, it brings the Commission on a collision route with the principles of causation and symmetry governing European Union merger control analysis.
机译：在最近的一系列并购决定中，以陶氏/杜邦案告终，欧盟委员会深刻地重新审视了其传统的创新分析，并最终引入了一些作者称之为“欧盟并购政策中的伤害的新颖理论”的文章。根据此理论，委员会不会在当事方正在开发类似产品的特定产品市场上研究创新的损害，而是对与特定产品市场无关的创新损害进行一般评估，而不考虑潜在的反竞争影响以这个为基础。本文的目的是表明，在过去的几年中，欧盟委员会在评估影响创新的兼并过程中逐渐偏离了“传统”损害理论。尤其是，我们认为，基于普遍的创新偏见，陶氏/杜邦公司开发的新颖的伤害理论是漫长旅程的着陆点，在此过程中，委员会逐步改变了适用于影响管道产品的传统案例的分析框架/潜在竞争对手。尽管这种立场可能受到合法政策目标的鼓舞，但它使委员会走上了一条因果关系和对称原则控制欧盟并购控制分析的冲突之路。

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