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Strict(er) Scrutiny: The Impact of Failed Divestitures on U.S. Merger Remedies

机译:严格审查:剥离失败对美国合并补救措施的影响

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摘要

Antitrust review of mergers and merger remedies, in particular, have been the topic of much recent conversation both in the legal world and popular political discourse. A recent string of failed divestitures has driven the U.S. antitrust agencies to analyze proposed remedies and proposed divestiture buyers with increasing scrutiny as they seek to avoid similar outcomes. This article details the history of recent divestiture failures and explores how the agencies have adapted their remedy vetting process in response through longer investigations, enhanced focus on particular aspects of buyers’ qualifications, and an increased insistence on up-front buyers, as well as the agencies’ success in persuading courts that proposed divestitures and/or buyers were inadequate in a series of recent litigated merger challenges. Against this backdrop, this article offers practical guidance for merger parties and would-be buyers to navigate the approval process amid the agencies’ heightened sensitivities to the qualifications of divestiture buyers. Finally, it suggests that there is little empirical support for the notion that the most concrete, observable agency responses will reduce the risk of divestiture failures in the future.
机译:尤其是在法律界和流行的政治讨论中,对合并和合并补救措施的反托拉斯审查尤其是最近的话题。最近发生的一系列失败的剥离行动促使美国反托拉斯机构对拟议的补救措施和拟议的资产剥离购买者进行分析,以求避免类似的结果,因此审查越来越严格。本文详细介绍了近期资产剥离失败的历史,并探讨了代理机构如何通过更长的调查,对购买者资格的特定方面的更多关注以及对前期购买者以及对购买者的更多要求的坚持,来调整其补救审查流程。代理机构在说服资产剥离和/或买主方面说服法院的成功不足以应对一系列近期诉讼中的合并挑战。在这种背景下,由于代理机构对资产剥离购买者的资格越来越敏感,本文为合并方和潜在的购买者提供了实用的指导。最后,它表明对于最具体,可观察的代理机构的回应将减少未来资产剥离失败的风险的观点,经验支持甚少。

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