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Vertical integration

机译：垂直整合

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摘要

Oliver Williamson's work on transaction cost economics, and more generally on the factors that determine the boundaries between firms and markets, has provided key insights that have significantly expanded our understanding of the attributes of transactions and organizations that lead to vertical integration and vertical contractual relationships more broadly. Transaction cost-based theories of vertical integration focus on the implications of incomplete contracts, asset specificity, information imperfections, incentives for opportunistic behavior, and the costs and benefits of internal organization. These theories focus on efforts by firms to mitigate transaction costs and various contractual hazards that may arise with anonymous spot market transactions by choosing among alternative organizational and contractual governance arrangements that can reduce these costs. There is substantial empirical support for these theories. Property rights-based theories are sometimes interpreted as formalizing some of Williamson's work. However, little empirical work has focused on property rights-based theories per se. Principal-agent theories of vertical integration that are distinguished from other organizational theories primarily by assumed differences in risk aversion between principals and agents and associated moral hazard problems have also been advanced. They add little to the other theories and have limited independent empirical support.
机译：奥利弗·威廉姆森（Oliver Williamson）的交易成本经济学研究，更笼统地说是确定公司与市场之间界限的因素，提供了重要见解，这些见解极大地扩展了我们对导致垂直整合和垂直合同关系的交易和组织属性的理解。宽广地。基于交易成本的垂直整合理论侧重于不完整合同，资产专用性，信息缺陷，机会主义行为的诱因以及内部组织的成本和收益的含义。这些理论侧重于企业为减少匿名的现货市场交易而可能产生的交易成本和各种合同风险的努力，方法是在可以降低这些成本的替代性组织和合同治理安排中进行选择。这些理论有大量的经验支持。基于产权的理论有时被解释为使威廉姆森的某些工作正式化。但是，很少有实证研究集中在基于产权的理论本身上。纵向整合的委托人-代理理论与其他组织理论的区别主要在于委托人和代理之间在风险规避方面的假定差异以及相关的道德风险问题。它们对其他理论没有多大帮助，并且对独立的经验支持有限。

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  • 来源
    《The Antitrust Bulletin》 |2010年第3期|p.545-586|共42页
  • 作者

    Paul L. Joskow;

  • 作者单位

    Economics and Management, Massachusetts Insti-tute of Technology;

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