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Antitrust policy toward agreements that settle patent litigation

机译:针对解决专利诉讼协议的反托拉斯政策

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The sets of circumstances analyzed above, namely asymmetries of information, asymmetries of expectations or the imminence of entry by unrelated competitors are not endemically rare. Accordingly, a policy of condemnation of agreements with financial payments would be unnecessarily costly to society in repressing socially beneficial settlements, and fomenting otherwise unnecessary litigation. In circumstances such as those analyzed here, payment by the incumbent to the entrant is not a reliable sign of an anticompetitive settlement. The only indicator with a degree of policy certainty under the situations we have analyzed is the expected date of entry under the agreement compared to the expected date of entry without the agreement. Antitrust policy should be configured to encourage a settlement agreement if its date of entry is socially advantageous relative to the expected date of entry under the litigation alternative, taking into account the benefits of avoiding the costs and risks of the litigation. This appropriate benchmark for the public interest should not be obscured by excessive atten- tion to the false issue of whether there is any financial dimension to the agreement, because the financial-payment criterion is not a reliable indicator of the social desirability of the settlement.
机译:上面分析的一系列情况,即信息的不对称,期望的不对称或无关的竞争者即将进入市场,在地方上并不罕见。因此,谴责以财政付款的协议的政策在压制对社会有益的和解以及煽动原本不必要的诉讼方面,对社会而言不必要地代价高昂。在这种情况下(如此处分析的那样),由任职方支付给参赛者并不构成反竞争解决的可靠迹象。在我们分析的情况下,唯一具有一定程度的政策确定性的指标是协议下的预期进入日期与未达成协议的预期进入日期相比。如果考虑到避免诉讼成本和风险的好处,则反托拉斯政策应配置为鼓励和解协议(如果该协议的签订日期相对于诉讼备选方案的预期签订日期而言具有社会优势)。对于公共利益的适当基准不应因过分注意协议是否存在财务方面的虚假问题而模糊不清,因为财务支付标准不是解决方案的社会可取性的可靠指标。

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