• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>The Antitrust Bulletin >Intellectual property, antitrust, and the economics of aftermarkets
【24h】

Intellectual property, antitrust, and the economics of aftermarkets

机译：知识产权，反托拉斯和售后市场经济学

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

The Supreme Court's Kodak decision presented an opportunity to resolve the conflict among the lower courts regarding how to analyze allegations of anticompetitive aftermarket behavior. Instead, it appears to have created additional confusion among the circuits. The disagreement between the Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit has recast the aftermarket issue in terms of the permissible scope of intellectual property rights under the antitrust laws. The Ninth Circuit observed that the patent and antitrust laws appear to be at odds with one another: "[o]ne body of law creates and protects monopoly power while the other seeks to proscribe it." But in Kodak and ISO, there should be no conflict between the two bodies of law. Conflict between the Sherman Act and the Patent Act only arises when there is a threat of anticompetitive harm arising from whatever monopoly power intellectual property rights confer. But when durable goods producers exercise control over their proprietary replacement parts, the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is remote. A manufacturer's acquisition of monopoly power in its own aftermarkets, due to intellectual property rights or otherwise, confers no additional opportunity to "exploit" consumers than already existed in the primary equipment market. Moreover, the extension of a "parts monopoly" to a "service monopoly" may result in a more efficient combination of service and parts. In this context, upholding a manufacturer's right to exclude others from its patented replacement parts and copyrighted diagnostic software is unlikely to undermine the antitrust objective of promoting consumer welfare and, in fact, furthers it when it leads to more efficient business practices.
机译：最高法院的柯达裁决为解决下级法院之间有关如何分析反竞争售后行为指控的冲突提供了机会。相反，它似乎在电路之间造成了额外的混乱。联邦巡回法院与第九巡回法院之间的分歧，就反托拉斯法所允许的知识产权范围而言，重塑了售后市场问题。第九巡回法院指出，专利法和反托拉斯法似乎相互矛盾：“法律体系创造并保护了垄断权，而另一方则试图禁止它。”但是在柯达和ISO中，两个法律体系之间不应存在冲突。 《谢尔曼法》和《专利法》之间的冲突仅在任何垄断权力知识产权所带来的反竞争损害威胁出现时才出现。但是，当耐用品生产商对其专有的替换零件实施控制时，反竞争伤害的可能性很小。由于知识产权或其他原因，制造商在其自己的售后市场中获得垄断权的行为，不会比初级设备市场中已有的机会“剥削”消费者。此外，将“零件垄断”扩展到“服务垄断”可能会导致服务和零件的更有效组合。在这种情况下，维护制造商将他人从其专利替换零件和受版权保护的诊断软件中排除的权利不太可能损害促进消费者福利的反托拉斯目标，并且，当它导致更有效的商业惯例时，它就可以进一步实现。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号