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Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese listed companies: A principal-principal perspective

机译:中国上市公司的跨国并购:从委托人到委托人的角度

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摘要

Chinese listed firms have gained the world's attention with several ambitious, high-profile cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In most of these deals, the Chinese government is the largest shareholder of the acquiring firms. As such, it may be the case that the Chinese government pushes through such deals even though they are not in the best interests of minority shareholders, giving rise to principal-principal conflicts. Along these lines, we hypothesize that increased government ownership in the acquiring firm will be associated with investors viewing a cross-border merger deal in less favorable terms. In addition, we hypothesize that environmental complexity will moderate this negative relationship. We test our hypotheses with a sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving Chinese firms from 2000 to 2008. We find support for the main hypothesis, that is, that investors are indeed skeptical of cross-border mergers and acquisitions deals when the government is the majority owner (I.e., principal-principal conflicts). However, we find no support for the moderating effect. We discuss the implications of these findings for researchers and practitioners and suggest nature research directions.
机译:中国上市公司通过几项雄心勃勃的,备受瞩目的跨国并购案,赢得了全世界的关注。在大多数此类交易中,中国政府是收购公司的最大股东。因此,即使中国政府不符合少数股东的最大利益,也可能会促成此类交易,从而引发本金与主体之间的冲突。沿着这些思路,我们假设收购公司中政府的所有权增加将与投资者以较不利的条件看待跨国并购交易有关。此外,我们假设环境复杂性将缓和这种负面关系。我们使用2000年至2008年间涉及中国公司的跨境并购示例检验了我们的假设。我们发现了对主要假设的支持,即,当政府采取行动时,投资者确实对跨境并购交易持怀疑态度。多数拥有者(即,主要原则冲突)。但是,我们发现不存在调节作用。我们讨论这些发现对研究人员和从业人员的意义,并建议自然研究方向。

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